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It was disturbing to observers on both sides of the Atlantic this spring to learn from the respected Pew Research Center that only 38 percent of the German people and 37 percent of the French held favorable views of the United States. The figures were in marked contrast to those on record from two years ago: 61 and 63 percent, respectively. A message that some might draw from the reports could be that NATO, while expanding geographically, is rotting away at the core. Writing in The Washington Post in early May, Robert Samuelson concluded that in European eyes, America and/or its leadership has come to represent "a permanent menace."

I have just returned from an exploratory trip to a number of continental capitals to take a measure of what might be described as a strategic breach in the alliance. Unfortunately, the impressions and conclusions from the experience were hardly more comforting. While personal warmth and courtesies were still very much in order, the discussions were strained on the European side, with barely concealed elements of both bewilderment and anger. Interlocutors representing the foreign offices, defense departments and security agencies in the capitals visited expressed dismay at what has become of transatlantic relations in the wake of the 9/11 attack on the United States. In particular, the new U.S. strategy of "preemptive strike" has become the focus of great criticism. The concept is broadly perceived among Europeans as unwise, unwarranted and dangerous.

The continuing conflict in Iraq is cited as a foreseeable consequence of fallacious policy. As Jean-David Levitte, the French ambassador to the United States, wrote in the New York Times last year, "We see Iraq as a very complex country, with many different ethnic groups, a tradition of violence and no experience of democracy. You can't create a democracy with bombs." The result is a badly frayed relationship between allies on opposite sides of the ocean.

Beginning with discussants in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, officials were not shy in expressing their views that terrorism is essentially a tactic, not a goal against which a victory can be won or lost. The American term, "war on terrorism," does not translate well into European languages. The threat of terrorism, which all agree is very real, is believed to be rather more amenable to mobilized civil actions and counteractions than to conventional military operations.

With these views as background, Europeans tend to assess NATO as somewhat less useful in counterterrorist efforts than their own emerging regional organization, the European Union (EU). They see NATO as an important military alliance; but the EU, in their view, is much broader in scope and lends itself more readily to dealing with lawlessness, which is how they perceive terrorism.

The murder of passengers and the destruction of rail cars by terrorists in Madrid on March 11, 2004, suggest a model for understanding the European view. The first responders to the disaster were local rescue teams. Where these were insufficient, national and international agencies provided stronger support and investigation.

There was no effort to invoke NATO, however, as had been done in response to the 9/11 attack on the. United States. Had allied forces been required, it appears more likely that European regional troops would have been mobilized than units from the United States. NATO might have provided some command and control facilities and perhaps some air transport, but any American contingents would likely have played a lesser role than those of local or regional availability.

As most Europeans view the EU, it is an organization that has grown from an economic free-trade community to a quasi-political entity with a president, a parliament and a draft constitution. It has open interior borders, an expanding code of law and a common currency. What is more, the currency, the Euro, has rocketed past the dollar to a position approaching one-third greater value. The EU has a nascent military structure that could become the first point of call among capable and willing members for dealing with threats to the community.

NATO has recognizable strengths not currently found in the EU, but with the disappearance of the proximate challenge formerly posed by forces of the Soviet Union, the EU appears, to a growing number of observers, as a potential security organization of first response. Few believe that NATO's days are over, but the advantages of an EU command structure are becoming more apparent. These are looming larger and more desirable to Europeans who find the American concept of preemptive warfare particularly disturbing. A greater role for the EU would tend to marginalize NATO and the United States, the preeminent player in the latter organization. With the EU speaking for Europe, the United States would likely find itself dealing with a bloc of powers rather than a disassociated group. While the United States would still be the most powerful participant, it would no longer be the largest and perhaps not the most relevant.

A common thread that ran through the discussions in all of the capitals visited was a need for greater dialogue between the United States and Europe. German foreign policy specialists suggested the establishment of an international institute of terrorism. Such an organization, they suggested, could provide machinery for studies of particular problems and for a continuous flow of ideas and debate among all of the participants. Clearly, the Europeans were surprised and alarmed at the emergence of a novel American military doctrine that they had had little opportunity to study or to respond to before it became the driving force behind the invasion of Iraq. As one German representative commented, "The fog of war is nothing compared to the fog of policy formulation."

At the offices of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) there was criticism of American views on terrorism that allegedly have driven U.S. policy in the wrong direction. With a focus on terrorism as the objective of its war, instead of as a tactic, Washington, according to them, has lost sight of the strategic dimensions of its struggle. Rather than unilaterally invading a secular state with no apparent ties to terrorism, the United States should have been, seeking improvements in a collective response to terror. As it is, one official commented, since Germany had no part in the policy-making phase of the plan for dealing with Iraq, it is now obliged to play a neutral role.

At the Defense Ministry, officials stated that the Bundeswehr was in the process of transformation. New national German guidance will permit the deployment of additional forces abroad, but only in close cooperation with allies and in the context of civilian political interest. They expressed a belief that at some point in the future, there will be a greater role for the EU in defense and security matters, including planning scenario development, coalition operations by capable and willing national forces and air protective operations from terrorist attacks from the sea. There may also be some national regional security commands established.

American representatives in Berlin commented on certain aspects of U.S. relations with Germany. Broadly speaking, they said, German-American relations are better than they were a year or so ago, but they still need improvement. Regarding the EU, the diplomats observed that the organization takes a lot of time to make decisions, hence the staff is not very comfortable talking to Americans. The day may come when the EU matures into an efficient, functioning body, but in their view, for now, the United States has a better opportunity to influence European thinking through NATO than through the EU-but it must make a better effort than it has in the past to keep the dialogue alive.

In Paris, Quai d'Orsay officials stated that their government is a strong supporter of NATO; but with respect to the terrorism issue, France and the United States need a good, long talk. They insist that France is not soft on terrorism. On the contrary, they say, it has a good record for taking terrorism seriously, providing an "unhealthy climate for terrorists, including relentless pursuit, 100 percent repression and toughness."